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Abstract: 
Adam Smith has recently been celebrated as a precocious theorist of commercial 
cosmopolitanism who decried the injustice of imperial conquest and extraction. This paper 
focuses on Smith’s endorsement of settler colonialism in North America and argues that 
Smith’s newfound cosmopolitanism is overstretched. Smith welcomed settler colonies as the 
embodiment of the “natural progress of opulence” and spared them from his invective against 
other imperial practices like chattel slavery and trade monopolies. Smith’s embrace of settler 
colonies, however, involved him in an ideological conundrum insofar as the prosperity of 
overseas settlements rested on imperial expansion and seizure of land from Native Americans. 
I contend that Smith muffled this disturbing link through a number of rhetorical strategies, 
evoking a vision of colonization without imperialism. Smith’s favorable treatment of settler 
colonialism, I conclude, belongs to a longer genealogy of representing capitalism as an 
essentially liberal economic system in the face of its decidedly illiberal history. Investigating 
this genealogy necessitates breaking with the currently dominant conventions of studying the 
history of political thought and placing intellectual history in conversation with social theory 
and political economy. 
 





Adam Smith is emblazoned in the scholarly and lay mind alike as the intellectual 
progenitor of economic liberalism, who upheld the sacred right of individuals to direct their 
property and labor, adumbrated the free market’s harmonious mediation of diverse interests, 
and prescribed a minimal if essential role to public authority in the institution of economic life. 
This familiar picture of Smith’s economic liberalism has recently been compounded by 
scholarly accounts of his cosmopolitanism. Breaking with the long-standing methodological-
nationalist conventions in the study of political thought, studies in intellectual history have 
illuminated the global scope and imperial nature of the political and economic phenomena to 
which Smith addressed his reflections, criticisms, and proposals.1 Above all, these studies 
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demonstrate that a frontal critique of early-modern European colonial empires – or what IPE 
scholars have retrospectively rechristened as “mercantilism” – was formative of Smith’s 
political economy. Pace contemporary liberals who might cite Smith’s intellectual patrimony 
for labor market reform or economic deregulation against broad-based Keynesian or welfare 
policies, Smith’s ire has been shown to be mainly aimed at colonial trade regulations that 
aggrandized powerful minorities, late-medieval/early-modern forms of servitude such as 
apprenticeship, serfdom, and chattel slavery, and monopolistic joint-stock trading companies 
that defrauded consumers at home and oppressed producers abroad.2 Smith’s criticism also 
extended to the deleterious effect of European empires on non-European peoples whom he did 
not judge to be culturally inferior to Europeans, despite his famous four-stage theory of 
savagery and civilization that his successors would retool into an ideology of imperial tutelage.3 
When combined with his conclusions about the universal economic and moral benefits of 
global commerce and his correlate advocacy of free trade as the best way to promote it, these 
normative commitments lend support to the laudatory portrait of Smith as a consummate 
modern cosmopolitan. Even if his strand of anti-imperial critique failed (as he himself 
predicted) to resonate with the political and economic elites of this time,4 the potent ideational 
brew of commerce, liberality, peace, and prosperity that he concocted has inspired subsequent 
generations of publicists, statesmen, and scholars, from Richard Cobden to Joseph Schumpeter 
to the contemporary adherents of commercial peace theory.5 
It is my contention in this essay that the newfound cosmopolitanism of Smith is in a 
certain sense overstretched because of insufficient attention to Smith’s views on settler 
colonialism, especially the British North American variant. I argue that Smith spared settler 
colonialism from the withering aspersion he poured upon territorial conquest and colonial 
slavery in the West Indies and armed trading and merchant sovereignty in the East Indies. 
Although he expressly decried territorial expansion and the destruction of indigenous peoples 
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as grave injustices, he did so in a manner that dissociated them from British agrarian colonial 
settlements that he held in very high regard. Instead, Smith reserved the odium of colonial 
expropriation for the Spanish and Portuguese Empires in the West, and the Dutch and British 
East India Companies in the East, which epitomized the general “European” avidity behind 
modern colonial ventures. The discursive exoneration of settlerism from empire, I maintain, 
worked through a series of binary tropes that juxtaposed occupation and conquest, liberty and 
oppression, “thinly inhabited” and “fully inhabited” countries, and Greek and Roman colonies. 
Consequently, if one cannot speak of an explicit justification of land appropriation and native 
dispossession in Smith’s writings (a la John Locke or Emer de Vattel), then one can certainly 
discern a systematic “deflection” of attention from these elements, but only to the extent that 
they laid down the structural conditions of British colonial settlements.6  
 I contend that the principal reason why Smith held American settler colonies at arm’s 
length from the infamy of empire is the special place they occupied in his political economy. 
North American colonies incarnated the closest approximation to the ideal trajectory of 
economic progress, or in Smith’s words, the “natural progress of opulence,” in human history. 
The pivot of the whole matter was land and liberty. First, unlike in post-feudal Europe, land in 
America was plentiful, cheap, and unbound by practices of primogeniture and entail. Secondly, 
unlike the rapacious monopolies of the East or the despotic plantations of the West Indies, 
North American colonies were relatively free from the corrupting touch of mercantile policies, 
thanks to the attenuating impact of oceanic distances on imperial authority. The combined 
effect of land and liberty was to spur rapid economic and demographic growth in colonial 
settlements, which in turn expanded the market for European industry, increased the scope for 
division of labor, and accelerated economic progress. However, whereas the relatively liberal 
government of the North American colonies could be explained by the British system of laws, 
a cheap and abundant supply of colonial land necessarily implicated issues of land 
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appropriation and indigenous displacement. This rerouted the argument back to the very terrain 
of empire which Smith was exhorting his contemporaries to leave behind. Smith responded to 
this conundrum by soft-pedaling the connection between imperial expansion and settler 
colonies through a series of rhetorical elisions that converged on what a recent commentator 
has labeled an “anti-imperial conception of colonies.”7 
The lack of an explicit rationalization of colonial land appropriation in Smith’s writings 
is arguably the reason why, with a few recent exceptions, this issue has received little scholarly 
attention.8 It is important to address the resultant cosmopolitan overstretch, not as a matter of 
textual exegesis, but in order to mark the limits of eighteenth-century commercial liberalism 
as a standpoint of anti-imperial critique. This is because there are plausible grounds to view 
global commerce as the historical twin of the colonial empire rather than its antithesis, a fraught 
“intimacy” that becomes particularly salient when cosmopolitan commerce, or global free 
trade, is posited as empire’s alternative9 – a point I elaborate in some detail in the second part 
of the paper. I am thereby less interested in ascertaining the authenticity of Smith’s personal 
anti-imperial commitments than in excavating his writings on empire and commerce for 
insights about the contradictions internal to the imperial political-economic formations of the 
eighteenth century. The broader political and theoretical stakes of this analysis cascade all the 
way down to our present as they concern how global capitalism has come to be imagined as an 
essentially liberal economic system in spite of its illiberal historical origins in territorial 
conquest, resource extraction, and bonded labor. While capitalism’s illiberal origins have been 
no secret to historians and social scientists attuned to its intersection with colonialism, this 
question has witnessed a resplendent comeback with the new histories of capitalism.10 There 
remains much to be written, however, on how these constitutive illiberalities have been 
perceived, interpreted, and negotiated in political and economic theory in ways that cordon 
them off from a putatively liberal and pacific essence of capitalism. My analysis of Smith’s 
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writings on political economy, empire, and colonies presents an attempt in this direction. It is 
also an invitation to conversation on rematerializing the growing debate on liberalism and 
empire.11 
 In what follows, I begin with a brief survey of Smith’s criticism of the economic follies 
and the moral enormities of overseas empires, followed by his reflections on the benign yet 
unintended consequences of European colonial expansion – above all the emergence of 
worldwide commercial networks and the formation of agrarian settlements in the Americas. 
The second section localizes the tension between dreadful imperial methods and their laudable 
commercial outcomes around the issue of settler colonialism, which posed for Smith an 
ideological problem of reconciling the rapid natural progress of opulence in British North 
American colonies with the territorial invasion and land seizure on which they necessarily 
depended. After examining the rhetorical strategies that Smith employed for navigating this 
problem, I conclude with the more general implications of this analysis for thinking about the 
historical and structural connections between empire and commerce, and between capitalism 
and cosmopolitanism. 
 
I. Of Adam Smith and Empire 
Critique of the Old Colonial System 
Smith was perhaps the brightest of the mid-eighteenth century luminaries of the 
Enlightenment who regarded the existing European overseas empires as “rapacious machines 
designed for extracting wealth and with little regard for the welfare or the public good of either 
the colonies or, where it still existed, indigenous populations.”12 Even a cursory reading of 
Smith’s observations on European maritime expansion reveals almost a visceral animosity 
towards what Donald Winch has called the “old colonial system,” comprised of imperial trade 
preferences, monopolies, tariffs and bounties, as well as chartered companies, slave-owning 
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plantocracies, and proconsular imperial governments.13 The moral and the economic 
systemically overlapped in Smith’s indictment of these institutional arrangements as at once 
imprudent, wasteful, and inefficient as well as violent, oppressive, and unjust. “The whole 
mercantile system, with its colonies and empires,” as Amartya Sen and Emma Rothschild put 
it summarily, was “a monument to unreason, the outcome of avidity, folly, and injustice.”14  
Smith furnished a comprehensive inventory of the economic and moral aberrations of 
empire in Chapter VII of Book IV of the Wealth of Nations, though his conclusions closely 
followed from the principles of political economy outlined in Books I-III.15 Smith began his 
discussion in this chapter with the principal motivation behind European colonial expansion. 
Unlike ancient Greek and Roman colonies which had been founded to relieve urgent 
demographic or political pressures, Smith concluded, “European colonies in America and the 
West Indies arose from no necessity” (WN II, 18). Instead, the origins of modern colonies were 
accidental and animated by the absurd secular superstitions about commerce and statecraft 
regnant in Smith’s time. The first colonial expeditions were fueled by the “sacred thirst of gold” 
(WN II, 21) rooted in the profoundly misconceived mercantile notion of wealth as consisting 
in precious metals (which Smith devoted the entire Book IV of the Wealth of Nations to 
debunk). Established by adventurers chasing “golden dreams,” overseas colonies were then 
perpetuated by the equally delusional mercantile principle of the balance of trade. Both of these 
premises reflected the rivalry between the territorial fiscal-military states of Europe, which had 
discovered in long-distance trade an answer to their obsession with revenue. Adopting foreign 
trade as a supreme matter of the statecraft had given birth to the post-Machiavellian 
“commercial reason of state.” This phenomenon was already diagnosed by David Hume who 
coined the term “jealousy of trade” to express the infection of commerce by political rivalry 
and exposed the erroneous equation of wealth with specie in his germinal quantity theory of 
money.16  
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Smith expanded these insights into a catholic denunciation of the old colonial system 
as a whole. The pivot of the mercantile system for Smith was the “spirit of monopoly” that 
instantiated in the economic policies of a government captured by merchant interests or 
“shopkeepers”. Colonial trade monopolies on enumerated goods, import tariffs and 
prohibitions, export bounties and drawbacks, and statutes on what could and could not be 
produced in the colonies were all intended to subordinate the colonies to the economic interests 
of the metropole –  in Smith’s sardonic words, “to found a great empire for the sole purpose of 
raising up a people of customers” (WN II, 58). In moral terms, mercantile regulations were 
odious as “impertinent badges of slavery,” a “manifest violation of the most sacred right 
mankind” in “employing their stock and industry in the way that they judge most advantageous 
to themselves” (WN II, 35). Their economic effects were even more pernicious. By artificially 
inflating the profit rate on colonial trades, they induced capital to migrate from domestic 
agriculture and manufactures to transoceanic commerce and carrying trade. This was not only 
a splendid misallocation of economic resources and thereby reducing the employment of 
productive labor at home, but it was also the surest way of retarding the rate of return to capital 
(and thereby hampering accumulation and economic growth) by luring it into investments with 
slower turnover cycles (WN I, 383-4; WN II, 49-52).  
The mercantile system, just like the feudal system that preceded it, represented a 
perversion of the “natural progress of opulence,” which was supposed to follow the sequence 
of agriculture, manufacture, foreign consumption trade, and only then, carrying trade (WN I 
301, 305, 311).17 Each step of the natural progress followed the increase in the number and 
overall volume of capitals and a progressive drop in profit rates, which induced capitalists to 
direct their savings to the next field of investment. Low profits across the board yet rapid capital 
accumulation, and high profits in certain sectors yet suboptimal economic growth, were 
entirely plausible scenarios for Smith (WN I, 125). The mercantile system, with its persistently 
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high profits in colonial trades, produced the second scenario. Unlike “profits of improvement” 
that issued from the increased productivity of labor and inspired healthy emulation in 
competitors,18 such “mercantile profits” followed from barriers to entry that curbed 
competition and hovered well above the “natural” level (WN II, 56). Mercantile regulations 
rendered foreign trade a zero-sum game by empowering merchants to buy below and sell above 
market prices and thereby beggar both the producers and the consumers. Smith’s 
contemporaries then mistook the effect of colonial system as the nature of foreign trade itself 
when they lamented their neighbors’ gain as their own loss. Last but not least, the colonies 
contributed next to nothing to the expenses of imperial defense and administration, laying the 
bill for the largest item of “unproductive consumption” at the doorstep of the metropolitan 
government. Heavier taxes and the ballooning public debt were the tribute paid to the chimera 
of possessing an empire (WN I, 277; WN II, 29). 
 Exclusive trading companies were the incarnation of the monopoly spirit and their 
shareholders and advocates the most “clamorous” of the factious interests in Britain (WN II, 
243-4). Smith observed that the economic and demographic progress in the New World 
colonies was directly proportionate to the waning activity and power of these companies in the 
Atlantic basin, though national trade monopolies (like British Navigation Laws) remained in 
force (WN II, 25-30). The record of exclusive companies in the East Indies trade, however, had 
quickly reached calamitous proportions. The Dutch East India Company had set the precedent 
by burning spice trees and depopulating entire islands in Indonesia to suppress competition and 
maintain monopoly profits (WN II, 73). The British East India Company had a shorter career 
in the region but its deeds promised to surpass those of the Dutch. After it secured the right to 
collect revenue (diwan) in Bengal, the Company had morphed into a perverse amalgamation 
of mercantile and sovereign principles, an amalgamation that could not but end in the 
systematic plundering of its new dominions. As the sovereign, the natural course for the 
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Company would be to maximize revenue through policies that promoted economic growth. 
Instead, its “mercantile habits” led the Company council and shareholders, as well as their 
political allies in Britain, to see Bengal as a windfall to be carried away. In addition to the 
general strategy of investing tax revenue in the commodity trade, Company agents abused 
monopoly privileges by engaging in private trade, both overseas and inland, in order to 
maximize their personal wealth before returning to Britain. “It is a very singular government,” 
Smith wrote, “in which every member of the administration wishes to get out of the country, 
and consequently to have done with the government, as soon as he can, and to whose interest, 
the day after he has left it and carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly indifferent” 
(WN II, 75). The brief rule of the Company had rendered a most fertile and prosperous province 
vulnerable to famine (the Bengal famine of 1769-1770), thus failing miserably at the ultimate 
test of sound economic policy (WN I, 404). While the EIC had defrauded the British people by 
charging monopoly prices on its imports and receiving bailout funds from the British 
government, the true cost of mercantile rapacity was borne by the natives of the East Indies. 
 The West Indies presented a similar picture wherein non-Europeans fell prey to the 
“folly and injustice” that “directed the first project of establishing these colonies.” The first 
victims were the indigenous inhabitants of America. These “harmless natives, far from having 
ever injured the people of Europe, had received the first adventurers with every mark of 
kindness and hospitality” (WN, II 40). After the “plundering” and “cruel destruction of the 
natives which followed the conquest” (a clear reference to Spanish conquista) (WN II, 26), 
came the enslavement of Africans. While white colonists wore slavery’s metaphorical badges, 
Africans who survived the middle passage bore the literal chains of “the unfortunate law of 
slavery” (WN II, 38). Smith judged slavery to be both morally reprehensible and economically 
inefficient. In his most provocative statement on the subject, he condemned the subjection of 
Africans, “those nations of heroes to the refuse of the jails of Europe, to wretches who possess 
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the virtues neither of the countries which they come from, nor of those which they go to, and 
whose levity, brutality, and baseness, so justly expose them to the contempt of the vanquished” 
(TMS, 221). Neither was slavery defensible on economic grounds. “It appears, accordingly, 
from the experience of all ages and nations, I believe, that the work done by freemen comes 
cheaper in the end than that performed by slaves” (WN I, 117). The roots of the institution 
therefore lay in political, not economic, soil: the “love of domination and tyrannizing” and “the 
pleasure men take in having everything done by their express orders, rather than to condescend 
to bargain and treat with those whom they look upon as their inferiors” (LJ, 179).  
Yet, in a post-feudal commercial age when profit and not status governed the decision 
to maintain laborers, the expense and low productivity of slave labor made it affordable only 
to a select stratum of capitalists, who invested in large specialized holdings producing colonial 
cash crops.19 Once again, the high profits enabled by colonial monopolies emerge as the culprit:   
The profits of a sugar–plantation in any of our West Indian colonies are generally much greater 
than those of any other cultivation that is known either in Europe or America: And the profits 
of a tobacco plantation, though inferior to those of sugar, are superior to those of corn, as has 
already been observed. Both can afford the expence of slave–cultivation (WN I, 315).20 
 
By contrast, Continental North American colonies boasted a more “demotic” agricultural 
structure with smaller landholdings mostly devoted to the cultivation of grain for the regional 
markets, where, Smith remarked, the “most perfect freedom of trade is permitted” (WN II, 
34).21 Accordingly, agricultural profits in the North American colonies were much lower, and 
with it, the number of slaves. What is more, slaves received much more humane treatment from 
North American masters, almost on par with hired servants (LJ, 178). In the extreme cases, as 
amongst Pennsylvania Quakers, slaves could even be unilaterally set free (WN I, 315). 
 
Theodicy of Global Commerce 
 As implied by the North American colonial experience, on which I dwell in detail 
below, the record of European colonial expansion was not entirely in the red, despite the blood 
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of the Native Americans and Africans. Modern colonies might not have arisen out of necessity, 
but the “utility which has resulted from them has been very great,” even though (or precisely 
because) such utility was not foreseen, let alone anticipated, by colonial adventurers and empire 
builders (WN II, 18). The heart of the matter was the connection between the division of labor 
and the extent of the market, the key theoretical premise with which Smith opened the Wealth 
of Nations. The unintended benefit of colonial expansion was to create for the first time a world 
market and a truly global commerce, which tremendously expanded the scope of the division 
of labor in Europe. In a world-historical observation, Smith wrote, 
By opening a new and inexhaustible market to all the commodities of Europe, it gave occasion 
to new divisions of labour and improvements of art, which, in the narrow circle of the antient 
commerce, could never have taken place for want of a market to take off the greater part of 
their produce. The productive powers of labour were improved, and its produce increased in 
all the different countries of Europe, and together with it the real revenue and wealth of the 
inhabitants” (WN I, 350). 
 
Critically, just as opulence in a commercial society suffused all ranks of the social order and 
rendered a frugal English peasant better off than an African king (WN I, 69), the benefits of 
global commerce cascaded beyond the immediate circle of maritime powers. Even landlocked 
countries like “Hungary and Poland, which may never, perhaps, have sent a single commodity 
of their own produce to America” had received encouragement to their industry from the 
introduction of colonial commodities, the need to produce a commodified surplus to pay for 
them, and the extended markets in which their surplus could fetch a higher price than in home 
markets (WN II, 42).22 
 The systematic unintended consequences of European colonialism were part and parcel 
of Smith’s larger theodicean narrative of economic progress elaborated in Book III of the 
Wealth of Nations. There, Smith laid out the “natural course” of economic development from 
agriculture to foreign commerce, only to note that “though this natural order of things must 
have taken place in some degree in every such society, it has, in all the modern states of Europe, 
been, in many respects, entirely inverted” (WN I, 311). The “unnatural retrograde” European 
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trajectory had followed from the “original engrossing of uncultivated lands” after the fall of 
the Roman Empire, creating an artificial scarcity of land through laws of primogeniture and 
entail. The result was a sordid pattern of high rents, lack of agricultural improvement, 
unproductive expenditure of revenue on retainers, and constant feudal warfare. The agricultural 
impasse was broken when Europe’s late-medieval burgher towns stimulated the 
commercialization of agriculture by furnishing luxury goods on which great landlords 
squandered away their wealth and thereby their political influence (WN I, 331). While no one 
in this story intended to save agrarian Europe from its misery, their actions unwittingly paved 
the way to political order in the countryside, longer terms of lease in land, agricultural 
improvement, and productive employment of disbanded retainers. Commercial and 
manufacturing towns, instead of arising from agricultural surpluses, had pulled European 
countryside out of its feudal morass (WN I, 333) – hence the “retrograde” progress of opulence. 
The colonial system prima facie cut against the grain of natural progress by 
overemphasizing commerce over agriculture. However, since Europe’s progress in agriculture 
had already been hitched to the motive power of commerce, mercantile policies ultimately lent 
further strength to this trend. Smith wrote, “[s]ince the discovery of America, the greater part 
of Europe has been much improved. England, Holland, France and Germany; even Sweden, 
Denmark, and Russia, have all advanced considerably both in agriculture and manufactures” 
(WN I, 200). As Margaret Schabas, Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, and others have argued, the 
underlying grammatical structure of Smith’s political economy rested on the assumption of an 
orderly and ultimately benign natural world.23 At work was a relatively simple, stable, and 
uniform ecological substratum that not only made the principles of political economy 
universally applicable across Virginia, Scotland, India, and China (WN I, 111-2, 126),24 but 
also guaranteed the progress of opulence under the distortion of contingent human institutions, 
albeit more slowly and in more indirect and unforeseen ways. The steady if mundane 
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operations of the natural propensity to exchange and the desire to better one’s condition, 
combined with the application of properly divided human labor to nature and the saving of its 
fruits, managed to bore through the folly of grand human pretensions that animated the 
profligacy of individuals and states, or the unreason of empires and their wars. As the editors 
of the Wealth of Nations note in their introduction, the “belief in natural progress of opulence, 
almost in its inevitability, is so strong throughout the Wealth of Nations that, when dealing with 
a contemporary problem, Smith’s main objective is to isolate those barriers that lay in the path 
of natural progress as he saw it, and to advocate their speedy removal.”25  
Global commerce functioned as an unadulterated force of progress in this narrative arc 
insofar as it connected peoples in bonds of mutual dependence and expanded the channels of 
material and cultural intercourse. It was the key mechanism in Smith’s theory of sociability 
that followed the thread of “unsocial sociability” spun by the seventeenth-century natural jurist 
Samuel Pufendorf who had predicated human sociability on the inescapability of social 
cooperation in the material production of human wants, in other words, on the collective 
conditions of realizing the individual right to self-preservation.26 The extent of the division of 
labor was therefore a function of the intensity of human sociability, which in turn depended on 
regularized communication with others. In an Enlightenment revaluation of oceanic 
connections, Smith deemed access to communication by water as the necessary (and to some 
extent sufficient) condition of commerce and civilization.27 Ancient Egypt, India, and China 
had been “civilized” early thanks to navigable rivers that made intensive exchange and travel 
possible, while inland Africa and Tartary had remained “in the same barbarous and uncivilized 
state” since the dawn of history (WN I, 75). This was because “closed societies had a tendency 
to stagnate linguistically, socially, and economically. A general instinct for improvement 
would be awakened when such a society was exposed to outside pressure.”28  
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The extent to which legal institutions allowed the natural dynamic between commerce 
and opulence to operate without inhibition explained for Smith the variation in economic 
progress across different nations in his time. China, for instance, approximated to a stationary 
state because, although it had followed the natural path from agriculture to manufacture, its 
laws prohibited foreign trade and forced upon the country an unnatural involution (WN I, 126). 
Europeans had found Indostan in a comparable condition before they forced it into a regressive 
state by plundering its stock and wage fund (WN I, 111-2). “The civilizations of Asia were 
supposed to possess an internal but not an external commerce,” comments J. G. A. Pocock.29 
“Their ships did not sail to Europe in search of trade, and they had not remodelled their societies 
around its pursuit. This had not kept them from opulence, but it had kept them from progress.”30 
As a result, Asian civilizations remained, broadly speaking, in the agricultural stage of Smith’s 
four-stage theory.  
Before I move on to Smith’s celebration of North American colonies as the empirical 
incarnation of the natural progress of opulence, an objection to the interpretation advanced here 
ought to be considered, as this objection directly impinges on my analysis of Smith’s rhetorical 
deflections on settler colonialism. The portrait of Smith as an enthusiastic champion of 
“enlightened” commerce has been challenged by Sankar Muthu, who highlights “the gross 
imbalances of power, destructive economic inefficiencies, and horrific cruelties that, Smith 
believed, went hand in hand with the increasingly integrated world of his day.”31 This leads 
him to diagnose in Smith’s writings a “far deeper ambivalence about commercial life.”32 In a 
critical passage enlisted to this conclusion, Smith catholically declared, 
To the natives, however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which 
can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which 
they have occasioned. These misfortunes, however, seem to have arisen rather from accident 
than from any thing in the nature of those events themselves. At the particular time when these 
discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the 
Europeans, that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those 
remote countries” (WN II, 65). 
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It is possible to interpret this passage in two distinct, though not mutually exclusive, ways. The 
first of these, forwarded by Muthu and reiterated by Thomas Hopkins, emphasizes Europeans’ 
“accidental military preponderance” at the time of the initial colonial encounters, which Smith 
hoped would be overturned at a future time so as to give rise to a balance of power between 
Europeans and non-Europeans.33 At stake here is the question of whether existing power 
relations are understood to express deeper and essential hierarchies between different cultures. 
In this reading, pace contemporary and subsequent imperial ideologues, European domination 
was neither inevitable nor followed from any inherent superiority of the colonizers. 
The second interpretation, which I propose here, has as its stakes the very conceptual 
parameters of commerce in its relationship to empire. I hold that in parsing out what is 
“accidental” and what is “in the nature” of global commerce, Smith attempted to isolate 
commerce as a natural and thereby essentially peaceful and beneficial principle, while 
relegating the violence operative in globalizing commerce to an incidental and contingent 
status. Expressed in terms of the modes of historiography available to Smith, commerce 
properly belonged to the “natural history” of humanity, growing out of the natural propensity 
to truck, barter, and exchange, following the “changing modes of subsistence in mankind’s 
progress from a savage state to civilization.”34 By contrast, colonial empires, notwithstanding 
their world-historical role in rendering commerce global, belonged to the “civil history” of 
Europe that encompassed those events that were “aberrant, deviant, and even inexplicable by 
the operations of nature.”35 Smith’s original assumption that modern colonies “arose from no 
necessity” was critical to according them an accidental role in the history of global commerce. 
In the same theoretical move, then, Smith admitted the violence and injustice of colonial 
expansion, yet categorically denied that it had anything to do with the pacific and progressive 
essence of commerce. To the contrary, he never tired of repeating in the section “Of Colonies” 
that whatever economic progress was to be observed in in the colonies occurred in spite of 
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colonial regulations and thanks to the silent and natural workings of commerce (WN II, 40-1). 
In short, the effects of commerce unfolded most splendidly when the disturbances of contingent 
human institutions, especially the institutions of the colonial system, were at their lightest. In 
this reading, there is nothing “ambivalent” about commerce per se, only about the “history” of 
global commerce. 
Yet, there was one special case wherein the categorical distinction between commerce 
and empire, between natural progress of opulence and the violent processes of colonial 
expansion, proved particularly difficult to sustain. It is to this case, to the settler colonies in 
North America, we now turn. 
 
II. Of Adam Smith and Colonies 
Settler Colonies and Natural Progress of Opulence 
Smith reserved his most exuberant accolades for the development of British settler 
colonies in mainland North America, which are in stark contrast to his assessment of the eastern 
imperial dominions (WN I, 111-2). The Wealth of Nations is replete with fascination at the 
colonies’ “thriving” economic and demographic growth. Unlike the “slow and gradual” 
improvement of Europe, the “stationary” condition of China, and the “decaying” state of India, 
American colonies were “rapidly progressing,” as attested by the doubling of the population in 
the British colonies every twenty-five years (as opposed to every five hundred years in Europe) 
(WN I, 110, 116). As Nicholas Phillipson astutely observes, Smith presented the “experience 
of colonial America the classic, and indeed the only possible example of a society whose 
progress had been rapid and natural by comparison with that of Europe.”36 “In a newly 
occupied land, such as America,” Hont similarly writes, “the succession of stages suggested 
by the four-stages theory was indeed natural, and thus the best sequence to follow.”37 The 
beauty of the American case, at least as rendered by Smith, was the simplicity of the causes of 
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opulence: “plenty of good land, and liberty to manage their own affairs their own way, seem 
to be the two greatest causes of the prosperity of all new colonies” (WN II, 28).  
First, liberty. The concrete example of settler colonies was critical for defending 
Smith’s “natural system of perfect liberty” from charges of mere speculation and for 
demonstrating that liberty actually delivered prosperity. Although all European colonies were 
originally conceived as imperial provinces dependent on the mother country, “the great 
distance from Europe has in all of them alleviated more or less the effects of this dependency” 
(WN II, 25). The operations of commercial intercourse and division of labor in America were 
thus greatly relieved from the institutional deadweight of feudal sediments overlain with 
mercantile regulations in Europe. Consequently, the employment of land, labor, and capital, 
and the distribution of profits and wages followed a course radically different than that of the 
Old World. Disburdened of hereditary nobilities, primogeniture, and entail, land ownership in 
America tended to be dominated by small proprietors who were much more likely than great 
landlords to attend to its cultivation with assiduity and frugality. Farmers paid no rent and low 
taxes, which incentivized them to maximize output. The abundance and fertility of land pushed 
up agricultural profits, notwithstanding high interest rates and high wages due to low capital-
land and capital-labor ratios (WN I, 124-5; WN II, 23-4). Farmers ploughed their profits back 
into cultivation while laborers saved to become landowners themselves. Capital naturally 
flowed into agriculture where it employed the highest number of productive hands, and that 
without any active government encouragement, as had been proposed by the “agricultural 
system” of the Physiocrats. On this basis, British legislation devised to curb manufacturing in 
the colonies and force them to specialize in agriculture was economically redundant and 
morally offensive (WN II, 35). 
These salutary effects of liberty were particularly prominent in the “English colonies 
of North America” whose progress had been more rapid than that of their Spanish, Portuguese, 
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and French counterparts. While the English colonies sat on arguably less fertile land, “the 
political institutions of the English colonies have been more favourable to the improvement 
and cultivation of this land, than those of any of the other three nations” (WN II, 28). The 
Spanish and the French had replicated in their colonies some version of the feudal engrossing 
of uncultivated land and thereby retarded agricultural improvement and economic progress 
(WN, II 29). On the other hand, “the genius of the British constitution which protects and 
governs North America” had shown what human labor could unleash when it was applied to 
nature with proper specialization of skill and freedom from artificial institutions (WN I, 112).38 
Smith’s comparison was not fortuitous. In the eighteenth-century enlightened imaginary, Spain 
and France stood for absolutist monarchies with territorial empires of conquest akin to Sparta 
or Rome, against which the British maritime empire shone as a commercial empire of liberty 
similar to Athens or Carthage. “For some of the French and Spanish critics of empire, the 
British, for all their obvious failings had come the closest to creating what the physiocrat 
Francois Quesnay in 1766 … called a ‘Carthaginian constitution.’”39 As I discuss shortly, this 
association between ancient Greek colonization, empire of liberty, and the natural progress of 
opulence formed a powerful sematic constellation central to Smith’s position on empire and 
colonies. 
Secondly, land. As mentioned earlier, Smith admitted that the opulence of the colonies 
had increased in spite of mercantile regulations that still exerted considerable sway. “The 
policy of Europe” had “very little to boast … in the prosperity of the colonies of America” (WN 
II, 40). Even the government of the British colonies were only “somewhat less illiberal and 
oppressive,” as impressive as the results of this relative liberality had been (WN II, 37, 40). The 
underlying cause of prosperity, arguably deeper than that of liberty, was the “abundance and 
cheapness of land, a circumstance common to all new colonies,” which presented “so great an 
advantage as to compensate many defects in civil government” (WN I, 201). In the section 
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“Causes of the Prosperity of New Colonies,” there are more than a dozen (in my counting, 
fourteen) invocations of “waste land,” “plenty of good land,” “great extent of land,” “cheapness 
of good land,” and cognate expressions in a mere few pages (WN II, 23-29).40 A particularly 
forceful passage reads, “[t]he plenty and cheapness of good land are such powerful causes of 
prosperity that the very worst government is scarce capable of checking altogether the efficacy 
of their operation” (WN II, 27). Here was a most lucid encapsulation of the conflict between 
commerce and empire, between the natural course of opulence and the interference of human 
institutions, and between the uncoerced flow of capital to the most productive employments 
and the mercantile restrictions of the colonial system. American land constituted the stage for 
“the principal drama in Smith’s account of the progress of opulence,”41 a drama that reached 
its climax in 1776 with what Smith saw as the “revolt of commerce and its attendant social 
structures against obsolete structures of empire.”42 Insofar as it promised unhindered markets 
in land, the emancipation of labor from corporations, and the sacred right of free enterprise, 
this revolt bore a world-historical significance that transcended the immediate political 
question of Smith’s sympathy for the American cause or his anti-imperialism versus his 
imperial federationism.43 
If the source of liberty could be traced to the relatively liberality of the British 
constitution and the factor of oceanic distance, the source of colonial land posed a more 
difficult problem. Smith and his contemporaries well knew that Europeans had made contact 
with an inhabited continent and that their presence in the New World had been flourishing at 
the expense of the indigenous peoples. The attendant debate over rightful territorial claims in 
America, including the question of the rights of the original inhabitants, was by the 1760s more 
than two centuries old. Leaving aside the doctrine of discovery to which few contemporaries 
lent credence, the controversy over colonial expansion in America revolved around the ideas 
of conquest and occupation. As is well known to the scholars in the field, the doctrine of 
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occupation, most famously propounded by John Locke and Emer de Vattel, had taken over 
conquest as the doctrine of choice for justifying land appropriations in the Americas by 
representing the continent as devoid of dominium and imperium.44 As Hopkins notes, Smith’s 
remarks on this matter left little doubt that he “had little time for such apologetics; he was quite 
clear that the European conquest of America represented a grave injustice to the indigenous 
inhabitants.”45 Writing of the contact with the Americas, he lamented that the “savage injustice 
of the Europeans rendered an event, which ought to have been beneficial to all, ruinous and 
destructive to several of those unfortunate countries” (WN I, 350). In contrast to their popular 
depiction at the time as ferocious warriors unbound by civilized rules of engagement, Native 
Americans figured in Smith’s account as “naked and miserable savages,” “defenceless 
natives,” “harmless natives,” and “miserable and helpless Americans” (WN II, 19, 21-2, 40, 
72). As “savage” nations of hunters and gatherers “incapable of defending themselves,” they 
were driven off the land by the invaders.46 “In Africa and the East Indies,” by contrast, 
Europeans faced “barbarous” and populous nations of shepherds, which made it “more difficult 
to displace the natives, and to extend the European plantations over the greater part of the lands 
of the original inhabitants” (WN II, 72). Here was an unequivocal admission of the connection 
between the forcible displacement of the natives and the establishment of settler colonies. The 
question is: to what extent did Smith see the North American colonies protected by the genius 
of the British constitution to be implicated in this original sin of military incursion and native 
displacement? 
 
Colonialism Without Imperialism 
My answer is, even if Smith saw (to borrow a metaphor from Marx) the congenital 
blood of colonial conquest on the cheek of British settler colonies, he chose to direct his 
readers’ attention away. A number of rhetorical elisions cut across Smith’s remarks on the 
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colonies that pass the odium of imperialism onto the “Spaniards” or some unspecified 
“Europeans” as reincarnations of the Roman empire of conquest, while muffling the 
implication of the British in the same process. For instance, we find “Columbus” and the 
“council of Castile” as responsible for “tak[ing] possession of countries of which the 
inhabitants were plainly incapable of defending themselves” and “plundering of the 
defenceless natives” (WN II, 21). “A project of conquest,” we are told, “gave occasion to all 
the establishments of the Spaniards in those newly discovered countries” (WN II, 22). Not only 
the Spanish crown but also the Spanish settlers are credited with conquest, this time of Mexico 
and Peru, followed by the “cruel destruction of the natives” (WN II, 26, 40).  Elsewhere, when 
Smith spoke of “coveting the possession of a country” inhabited by natives, the “savage 
injustice” done to them, or the “disorder and injustice [that] peopled and cultivated America,” 
he referred to “the Europeans,” “the people of Europe,” or “the European governments” as the 
subject of these acts.  
What is strikingly absent in these passages are parallel indictments of the British 
government and settlers for partaking in territorial expansion in America. This is in stark 
contrast to the molten ire that dripped from Smith’s pen, as we saw earlier, when he declaimed 
expressly against the British East India Company or British slavers. Instead, when he did speak 
of the origins of British settlements, Smith followed a circuitous path and treaded carefully 
around conquest and displacement. His account of the prosperity of the colonies opened with 
the following paragraph: “The colony of a civilized nation which take possession of a waste 
country, or of one so thinly inhabited, that the natives easily give place to the new settlers, 
advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness than any other human society” (WN II, 23, 
emphases added). Smith then substantiated the semantic equivalence of natural progress, rapid 
growth, and the settler colony through a political economic analysis of land-labor ratio and the 
movement of rents, profits, and wages. To illustrate this point, he adduced “the progress of 
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many of the antient Greek colonies towards wealth and greatness,” which was explained by 
“plenty of good land” and the “liberty to manage their own affairs in the way they judged most 
suitable to their own interest” (WN II, 24). Crucially, it was implied that Greek colonies were 
not colonies of conquest, as they had been established “in countries inhabited by savage and 
barbarous nations, who easily gave place to the new settlers” (WN II, 24, emphasis added). To 
clinch this point with a contrast, Smith invoked “the history of the Roman colonies” and found 
their progress to be “by no means so brilliant.” This was because Roman colonies “were all 
established in conquered provinces which in most cases had been fully inhabited before. The 
quantity of land assigned to each colonist was seldom very considerable, and as the colony was 
not independent, they were not always at liberty to manage their own affairs” (WN II, 24, 
emphases added).  
Once the binaries of settlement/conquest, vacant/inhabited, free/dependent, 
Greek/Roman were in place, Smith turned to the modern European experience and observed, 
In the plenty of good land, the European colonies established in America and the West Indies 
resemble, and even greatly surpass, those of antient Greece. In their dependency upon the 
mother state, they resemble those of ancient Rome; but their great distance from Europe has in 
all of them alleviated more or less the effect of this dependency. … The progress of all the 
European colonies in wealth, population, and improvement, has accordingly been very great 
(WN II, 25). 
 
In these and earlier passages, we can discern a continuum of colonial government and social 
progress, bookended by the Roman and Greek models, and keyed to the variables political 
liberty and unhindered appropriation of land. On this continuum, one could distinguish between 
the conquered dependencies of Asia and the settler colonies of America, and within settler 
colonies, between the proconsular viceroyalties of Spain and the quasi-republican settlements 
of Britain. The resemblance with the “Greek ideal of colonization,” as Jonsson notes, was at 
its strongest in the British colonies, which were akin to “embryonic metropoles. Given 
sufficient autonomy of development, they would eventually follow the “natural progress of 
opulence” to reach the liberty and prosperity of the mother country.”47 To keep with the Greeks, 
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perhaps a more suggestive metaphor than embryo would be homunculus, a tiny yet fully formed 
body, transplanted into a virgin and fertile womb where it grew rapidly. This finds support in 
Smith’s observations that “colonists carry out with them a knowledge of agriculture and of 
other useful arts” as well as “the habit of subordination, some notion of the regular government 
which takes place in their own country, of the system of laws which support it, and of a regular 
administration of justice” (WN II, 23). Such wholesale transplantation of organization, 
technology, and institutions accelerated the natural progress of opulence by abridging the 
“many centuries” that would have to elapse for the “natural progress of law and government” 
to “grow up on its own accord … among savage and barbarous nations” (WN II, 23). 
 To conclude, as one moved from the Roman-Spanish to the Greek-British end of the 
spectrum, coercion and conquest faded away, and the explanation of cheap and abundant land 
shifted from Europeans “destroying” the natives to the natives “giving place” to the settlers. 
Disavowing the connection between settler colonies and imperial expansion made it possible 
to simultaneously espouse the first as the historical incarnation of natural progress and global 
commerce, while denouncing the second as a violent aberration from the natural order and 
commercial ideal. Smith could square the circle of being an uncompromising critic of Britain’s 
old colonial system and championing its overseas settlements only by directing attention away 
from their intimate intersection in colonial land appropriation and indigenous displacement. 
When myths of waste lands and spontaneous settlements did not suffice to screen from view 
the liaisons of empire and colonies, the Spanish or the Europeans were summoned to bear the 
onus of violence and injustice. 
One could conjecture that Smith knew that British colonial settlements were founded 
in conquest and the displacement of the natives as much as the Spanish and Dutch empires, but 
chose to equivocate.48 Alternatively and more plausibly, one could surmise that he earnestly 
held that America was a waste land in which natives had no property. When contrasting the 
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availability of land in America and Europe, Smith wrote, “land, indeed, is in North America to 
be had almost for nothing, or at a price much below the value of the natural produce; a thing 
impossible in Europe, or, indeed, in any country where all lands have long been private 
property” (WN I, 334). “Private property” in this passage can be interpreted either as a metonym 
for the feudal engrossing of land or, in my view more convincingly, as the institution of private 
property pure and simple. The latter interpretation implies the original absence of property in 
America as the reason for the abundant supply of land to be acquired for settlement, which 
depressed land prices to “almost nothing” – a point that would be forcefully analyzed several 
decades later by E. G. Wakefield, the political economist, colonial reformer, and editor of the 
Wealth of Nations.49 This second interpretation also finds support in Smith’s four-stage theory 
in Lectures of Jurisprudence wherein “savage” and “barbarous” people are argued to lack 
notions of permanent landed property. This was not because of any deficiency in rationality 
but because of their pre-agrarian modes of subsistence that failed to translate into the 
occupation of land. No sooner Smith acknowledged horticultural practices in America than he 
disqualified them: “Their women plant a few stalks of Indian corn at the back of their huts. But 
this can hardly be called agriculture.” (LJ, 54).50 Likewise, the references to pre-Columbian 
cultivation of “Indian corn, yams, potatoes, bananes &c. plants” in the Wealth of Nations did 
not dent Smith’s persistent designation of Native Americans as “savages” throughout the text 
(WN, 20). The economy of hunting had as its jurisprudential corollary the absence of any 
permanent notion of property beyond what one had in one’s possession. The “greatest [step] in 
the progression of society,” to return to Lectures, was between the “state of hunters, the most 
rude and barbarous of any” and the “state of shepherds,” for in this step “the notion of property 
is extended beyond possession” (LJ, 119). And Smith placed “the Americans at this day” 
squarely in the state of hunters: “in North America, again, where the age of hunters subsists, 
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theft is not much regarded. As there is almost no property amongst them, the only injury that 
can be done is the depriving them of their game” (LJ, 55).51 
Here, once again we see Smith running in two directions.  Even if we concede that 
Smith did not engage in the kind of open imperial apologetics associated with Locke and Vattel, 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the assumption of American land as res nullius was 
deeply built into his view of the European expansion. This is consistent with this theory of 
occupation in Lectures and consonant with his language in the Wealth of Nations. On the other 
hand, Smith openly voiced his outrage about the conquest and extirpation of the indigenous 
peoples that proceeded in lockstep with European settlements in the New World. But then, he 
lauded European settlements as the testimony to the natural progress of opulence under 
conditions of abundant land and liberty. If one could find one principle that could reconcile 
these divergent commitments, one that kept the beneficial effects of colonial settlement but did 
away with the objectionable means of its creation, that would be occupation without conquest 
(which, incidentally, shows Smith to be much closer to Locke than contemporary 
commentators would admit). Nonetheless, Smith gave no indication of how this occupation 
without conquest would actually look like in the American context. As Rothschild and Hont 
have variously argued, Smith’s extensive critique of existing imperial practices was not 
matched by positive alternatives or detailed proposals for reform.52  
I have argued that Smith’s navigation of these tensions turned on the analogy with the 
Greek model of colonization, one in which occupation was not stained by conquest, the lands 
occupied were either waste or very thinly inhabited, and the natives gave place to the settlers. 
Telescoping the ancient Greek and the modern British colonies helped evade the question of 
conquest and land appropriation, and where it could not be evaded, it was displaced onto the 
Spanish or the Europeans that incorporated the Roman model. By downplaying the imperial 
conditions of settler colonies, Smith opened up a space – however mythical, tenuous, and in 
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need of constant rhetorical policing – for imagining colonization without imperialism, and 
commerce without empire. Yet to the extent that Smith clung to the ideal of settler colonization, 




To highlight the contradictions of Smith’s intellectual commitments and his rhetorical 
strategies for navigating them is not to impugn the sincerity of his critique of the old colonial 
system. Nor it is to suggest, as David Williams has recently done, that he “[did] not seem to 
recognise that taking ‘possession’ of land in new colonies might have a significant impact on 
native peoples.”53 As shown above, Smith explicitly admitted the link between native 
displacement and European settlement and harped on the problematic nature of the imperial 
methods of expansion, even if he occasionally took refuge in the systematic unintended benefits 
that these acts of folly and injustice generated, such as the population and civilization of 
Mexico and Peru (WN II, 25). Williams maintains, importantly, that the stakes of the matter 
reside less in the consistency or the motives of Smith’s position on colonialism. Rather,  
the significance of this is that the ambivalences we find in Smith (and others) point in the 
direction of some of the more general issues involved in anti-colonial argument from within 
the liberal tradition. To the extent that liberal thinkers employ a universal moral framework 
and/or visions of progress … it is hard to avoid engagement with the possibility that the 
achievement of universal moral frameworks or progress might be furthered by colonial (or 
colonial-type) projects.54  
 
The call to widen the aperture beyond Smith to capture the limits of liberal anti-imperial 
critique is most welcome. However, the argument itself is not entirely novel insofar as it casts 
liberalism’s ambivalent relationship to empire as an index to the problem of accommodating 
colonial, or more broadly cultural, difference within a universalist framework. Although 
arriving at different conclusions, it follows a script that has dominated the recent scholarship 
on liberalism and empire since Uday Mehta’s eponymous book, which set the terms of the 
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debate around problems of universalism and difference and incited his detractors to respond in 
kind.55 A full-throated analysis of the shortcomings of this culturalist bent exceeds the scope 
of this essay, but it poses a useful counterpoint for an alternative reading of the tensions that 
cut across Smith’s writings on empire, colonies, commerce, and progress. 
 I believe we can think of the conundrums in Smith’s work as representative of the 
broader ideological problem of carving a liberal ideal of commerce out of the historical reality 
of empires that gave occasion to it. There is a long, and newly reinvigorated, lineage of studies 
that have examined the formative role of colonialism and imperialism in the making of global 
capitalism, which has cut into the mainstream image of capitalism as essentially a liberal 
market order, albeit one that relies on non-market economic institutions for its functioning.56 
Most recently, for instance, Sven Beckert has coined the term “war capitalism” to capture the 
indispensable role of state coercion and imperial force in reshaping and reorienting global 
relations of property, exchange, and labor to give rise to the modern capitalist world 
economy.57 Against this background, the issue that clamors for the attention of the intellectual 
historian is how one could derive an idealized liberal ideal of global commerce from a world 
of territorial conquest, labor bondage, and forced exchange, and then institute this idealized 
image as the core feature of capitalism while relegating the constitutive violence of colonialism 
and imperialism to the “prehistory” of capital.58 This would be a story about the systematic 
disavowals of liberalism that have made commerce and capitalism the categorical antithesis of 
imperialism and colonialism.  Such a story, however, requires stepping outside “intellectual 
history” as understood by the linguistic contextualist (“Cambridge School”) approach, which 
restricts relevant contexts to the language games available to thinkers under study, 59 and 
expanding the context to encompass the socioeconomic relations located in the terrain of 
empire.60 At the heart of this story would be the entwined histories of not only liberalism and 
empire but also capitalism and colonialism. It is to this story, to the history of liberal disavowal 
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of colonial capitalism, that Smith’s vision of colonization without imperialism, of commerce 




Armitage, David. 2013a. “The International Turn in Intellectual History.” In Foundations of 
Modern International Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Armitage, David. 2013b. “The Elephant and the Whale: Empires and Oceans in World 
History.” In Foundations of Modern International Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Armitage, David. “John Locke: Theorist of Empire?” In Foundations of Modern International 
Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Baptist, Edward. The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American 
Capitalism. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Beckert, Sven. 2014. Empire of Cotton: A Global History. New York: Penguin. 
 
Bell, Duncan. 2007. The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-
1900. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Bell, Duncan. 2016. “Dream Machine: On Liberalism and Empire.” In Reordering the World: 
Essays on Liberalism and Empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Campbell, Roy and Andrew Skinner. “General Introduction.” In An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, vol. II of the 
Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
 
Dawson, Michael. 2016. “Hidden in Plain Sight: A Note on Legitimation Crises and the Racial 
Order.” Critical Historical Studies 3 (1): 143-161. 
 
Eley, Geoff. 2007. “Historicizing the Global, Politicizing Capital: Giving the Present a Name,” 
History Workshop Journal 63 (1): 154-88. 
 
Fitzmaurice, Andrew. 2014. Sovereignty, Property, and Empire, 1500-2000. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Fraser, Nancy. 2014. “Behind Marx’s Hidden Abode,” New Left Review 86. 
 
Fraser, Nancy. 2016. “Expropriation and Exploitation in Racialized Capitalism: A Reply to 
Michael Dawson.” Critical Historical Studies 3 (1): 163-178 
 
Onur Ulas Ince 
APT 2016 
 29 
Gartzke, Erik. 2007. “The Capitalist Peace.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (1): 166-
191. 
 
Gordon, Peter. 2014. “Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas.” In Rethinking 
Modern European Intellectual History, ed. Darrin McMahon and Samuel Moyn. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Hill, Lisa. 2001. “The Hidden Theology of Adam Smith.” European Journal of the Hsitory of 
Economic Thought 8 (1): 1-29. 
 
Hill, Lisa. 2010. “Adam Smith’s Cosmopolitanism: The Expanding Circles of Commercial 
Strangership.” History of Political Thought 31(3): 449-73. 
 
Hopkins, Thomas. 2013. “Adam Smith on Economic Development and the Futrue of the 
European Atlantic Empires.” In The Political Economy of Empire in the Early Modern World, 
ed. Sophus Reinert and Pernille Røge. London: Routledge. 
 
Hont, Istvan. 1987. “The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the 
Theoretical Foundations of the ‘Four-Stages Theory.’” In The Languages of Political Theory 
in Early-Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hont, Istvan. 2005a. “An Introduction.” In The Jealousy of Trade: International Competition 
and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Hont, Istvan. 2005b. “Free Trade and the Economic Limits to National Politics: Neo-
Machiavellian Political Economy Reconsidered.” In The Jealousy of Trade: International 
Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Hont, Istvan. 2005c. “Adam Smith and the Political Economy of the “Unnatural and 
Retrograde” Order.” In The Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State 
in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Hume, David. 1987. “Civil Liberty.” In in Essays Moral, Political, Literary, ed. Eugene Miller. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
 
Ince, Onur Ulas. 2012. “Not A Partnership in Pepper, Coffee, Calico or Tobacco: Edmund 
Burke and the Vicissitudes of Colonial Capitalism.” Polity, 44 (3): 340-372 
 
Ince, Onur Ulas. 2014. “Primitive Accumulation, New Enclosures, and Global Land Grabs: A 
Theoretical Intervention,” Rural Sociology 79 (1): 104-131. 
 
Jonsson, Frederik Albritton. 2010. “Rival Ecologies of Global Commerce: Adam Smith and 
the Natural Historians.” American Historical Review 115 (5): 1342-63. 
 
Lowe, Lisa. 2015. Intimacies of Four Continents. Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Mehta, Uday. 1999. Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal 
Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Onur Ulas Ince 
APT 2016 
 30 
Morefield, Jeanne. 2014. Empires Without Imperialism: Anglo-American Decline and the 
Politics of Deflection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Moyn, Samuel and Andrew Sartori (eds). 2013. Global Intellectual History. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 2013. 
 
Muthu, Sankar. 2003. Enlightenment Against Empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Muthu, Sankar. 2008. “Adam Smith’s Critique of International Trading Companies. 
Theorizing Globalization in the Age of Enlightenment.” Political Theory 36 (2): 185-212 
 
Muthu, Sankar. 2012a. “Introduction.” In Empire and Modern Political Thought, ed. Sankar 
Muthu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Muthu, Sankar. 2012b. “Conquest, Commerce, and Cosmopolitanism in Enlightenment 
Political Thought.” In Empire and Modern Political Thought, ed. Sankar Muthu. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pack, Spencer. 1996. “Slavery, Adam Smith’s Economic Vision and the Invisible Hand.” 
History of Economic Ideas, 4 (1-2): 253-69 
 
Pagden, Anthony. 1995. Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and 
France, c. 1500-c. 1800. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Pagden, Anthony. 2015. ““Savage Impulse-Civilized Calculation”: Conquest, Commerce, and 
the Enlightenment Critique of Empire.” In The Burdens of Empire: 1539 to the Present 
(Cambridge, 2015). 
 
Phillipson, Nicholas. 2000. “Language, Sociability, and History: Some Reflections on the 
Foundations of Adam Smith’s Science of Man.” In Economy, Polity, and Society: British 
Intellectual History, 1750-1950, ed. Stefan Collini, Richard Whatmore, Brian Young. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
 
Phillipson, Nicholas. 2010. Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
 
Pitts, Jennifer. 2005. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Liberal Imperialism in Britain and France. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Pitts, Jennifer. 2010. “Theories of Empire and Imperialism.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 13: 211-35. 
 
Pocock, J. G. A. 1990. “The Concept of A Language and the Métier d’Historien: Some 
Considerations on Practice,” in The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe, 
ed. Anthony Pagden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pocock, J. G. A. 2005. “Tangata Whenua and Enlightenment Anthropology.” In The Discovery 
of Islands: Essays in British History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Onur Ulas Ince 
APT 2016 
 31 
Pocock, J. G. A. 2006. “Adam Smith and History.” In Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith, 
ed. Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Røge, Pernille. 2013. “A Natural Order of Empire: The Physiocratic Vision of Colonial France 
After the Seven Year’s War.” In The Political Economy of Empire in the Early Modern World, 
ed. Sophus Reinert and Pernille Røge. London: Routledge. 
 
Rothschild, Emma. 2001. Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the 
Enlightenment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Rothschild, Emma. 2012. “Adam Smith in the British Empire.” In Empire and Modern 
Political Thought, ed. Sankar Muthu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rothschild, Emma and Amartya Sen. 2006. “Adam Smith’s Economics.” In Cambridge 
Companion to Adam Smith, ed. Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sartori, Andrew. 2006. “British Empire and Its Liberal Mission.” The Journal of Modern 
History 78 (3): 623-42. 
 
Schabas, Margaret. 2006. The Natural Origins of Economics. Chicago: Chicago University 
Press. 
 
Skinner, Quentin. 1969. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” History and 
Theory 8 (1): 3-53. 
 
Sklansky, Jeffrey. 2012. “The Elusive Sovereign: New Intellectual and Social Histories of 
Capitalism.” Modern Intellectual History 9 (1): 233-248. 
 
Smith, Adam. 1981. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. 
Campbell and A. S. Skinner, vol. II of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence 
of Adam Smith. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
 
Smith, Adam. 1982.  Lectures On Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael and P. G. 
Stein, vol. V of The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
 
Smith, Adam. 1982. Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, vol. I 
of The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith. Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund. 
 
Travers, Robert. 2009. “British India as a Problem of Political Economy: Comparing James 
Steuart and Adam Smith.” In Lineages of Empire: The Historical Roots of British Imperial 
Thought, ed. Duncan Kelly. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Vimalassery, Manu. 2013. “The Wealth of the Natives: Towards a Critique of Settler Colonial 
Political Economy.” Settler Colonial Studies 3 (4): 295-310. 
 
Wakefield, Edward G. 1968. “A View of the Art of Colonization.” In The Collected Works of 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield, ed. M. F. Lloyd-Prichard. London: Collins. 
 
Onur Ulas Ince 
APT 2016 
 32 
Wennerlind, Carl. “An Artificial Virtue and the Oil of Commerce: A Synthetic View of Hume’s 
Theory of Money.” 2008. In David Hume’s Political Economy, ed. Margaret Schabas and Carl 
Wennerlind. New York: Routledge. 
 
Whelan, Frederick. 2009. “Scottish Theorists, French Jesuits, and the “Rude Nations” of North 
America.” In Enlightenment Thought and Non-Western Societies: Sultans and Savages. New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Williams, David. 2014. “Adam Smith and Colonialism.” Journal of International Political 
Theory 10 (3): 283-301 
 
Winch, Donald. 1965. Classical Political Economy and Colonies. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Winch, Donald. 1978. Adam Smith’s Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision. 







1 Pitts 2010; Sartori and Moyn 2013; Armitage 2013a; Muthu 2012a; Bell 2016. 
2 Muthu 2008; Sen and Rothschild 2006; Rothschild 2012. 
3 Pitts 2005: 25-58; Whelan 2009; Williams 2014. 
4 Hill 2001, 2010; Muthu 2012b. While it is not the direct concern of this paper, an important 
caveat should be noted.  Not all scholars who admit Smith’s critique of the existing European 
empires take it as a sign of anti-imperialism as such. An alternative argument, which fastens 
on Smith’s proposal of uniting Britain’s imperial possessions under an imperial parliament, 
sees Smiths as an early proponent of imperial federationism that would come to its own in the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century ideas of “Greater Britain.” See, above all, Bell 
2007. 
5 On ideational continuities of commercial liberalism between the eighteenth and twentieth 
centuries, see Hont 2005a, Pagden 2015. For a recent iteration of commercial liberalism, 
rechristened as “capitalist peace,” see Gartzke 2007. 
6 I borrow the term “deflection” as a rhetorical strategy from Morefield 2014. 
7 Hopkins 2013: 60. 
8 Two recent exceptions are Williams 2014 and Vimalassery 2013. Another reason is that the 
studies of Smith’s position on the American empire is engulfed by attention to the conflict 
between colonists and the British state. 
9 Lowe 2016. 
10 Eley 2009; Sklansky 2012; Beckert 2014; Baptist 2014. 
11 Pitts 2010; Bell 2016. 
12 Pagden 2015: 226; also see Pitts 2005; Muthu 2003. 
13 Winch 1965. 
14 Sen and Rothschild 2006. 
15 All in-text citations are from the Glasgow editions of Smith’s works and are abbreviated in 
the following manner. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
                                                
Onur Ulas Ince 
APT 2016 
 33 
                                                                                                                                                  
henceforth “WN” (followed by volume and page numbers); Lectures on Jurisprudence, 
henceforth “LJ”; Theory of Moral Sentiments, henceforth “TMS.” 
16 Hume 1987; Hont 2005b; Schabas and Wennerlind 2008. 
17 As has been noted by a number of commentators, Smith’s conception of “natural progress” 
owed a great deal to Physiocratic defense of agriculture and free grain markets against 
Colbertian policies of promoting commerce and manufactures. See Rothschild 2001; Roge 
2013; Jonsson 2010. 
18 On Smith’s discourse on competition, emulation, and economic progress, see Hont 2005a: 
118-25. 
19 Pack 1996; Hopkins 2013; Campbell and Skinner 1981. 
20 High profits of colonial plantation agriculture also diverted metropolitan capital from 
domestic agriculture and encouraged absentee planters who sought to establish and manage 
plantations in the Caribbean through colonial agents (WN I, 170). 
21 On the ideas of “demotic” and “extractive” agriculture in colonial America, see Jonsson 
2010. 
22 Smith’s argument here followed Hume’s earlier reflections on the invigorating effect of 
commerce on “rude” and economically backward peoples. Its essence is not so much static 
gains from a more efficient allocation of resources but dynamic gains from mobilizing idle 
factors of production. Hume 1987: 160. 
23 Schabas 2006; Jonsson 2010. 
24 On the universalist claims of Smith’s political economy, see Travers 2009; Jonsson 2010. 
25 Campbell and Skinner 1981: 56. 
26 Hont 1987. 
27 Muthu 2012b. 
28 Phillipson 2000: 78-9. As has been noted by a number of commentators, Smith’s explanation 
of savagery and civilization is heavily circumstantial and does not credit essentialist 
explanations that would be advanced in the nineteenth century. See Pitts 2005; Muthu 2008, 
2012b; Whelan 2009. 
29 Pocock 2006: 284. 
30 Ibid. Smith wrote, “It is remarkable that neither the antient Egyptians, nor the Indians, nor 
the Chinese, encouraged foreign commerce, but seem all to have derived their great opulence 
from this inland navigation.” (WN I, 75) 
31 Muthu 2008: 188. 
32 Ibid, 203. 
33 Hopkins 2013: 64. 
34 Hont 2005c: 364. 
35 Pocock 2006: 276. 
36 Phillipson 2010: 228. For an objection that instead emphasizes the divergence of the 
American experience from the natural course, see Hopkins 2013. 
37 Hont 2005c: 374. 
38 Also see Schabas 2009: 94 
39 Pagden 2015; also see Armitage 2013b. 
40 Similar references can be found in WN I, 124-5, 201, 310, 333-4. 
41 Rothschild and Sen 2006: 335. 
42 Pocock 2006: 285. 
43 Winch 1978: 147-8. 
44 We also know that the same doctrine could be employed to defend indigenous rights, as 
when, for instance, Francisco de Vitoria pitted it against Spanish conquests, or when Samuel 
Pufendorf held that America was already fully occupied at the time of European arrival. The 
Onur Ulas Ince 
APT 2016 
 34 
                                                                                                                                                  
literature on this matter is vast. For outstanding and exemplary studies, see Pagden 1995; 
Fitzmaurice 2014. 
45 Hopkins 2013: 64. 
46 Smith’s views on the settled civilizations of Mexico and Peru were ambiguous. At times, he 
seemed to acknowledge their relative progress, as when he wrote, “[t]here were but two nations 
in America, in any respect superior to savages, and these were destroyed almost as soon as 
discovered. The rest were mere savages.” (WN I, 351). At other times, he dismissed the Spanish 
accounts of these civilizations as exaggerated, and argued that “in arts, agriculture, and 
commerce, their inhabitants were much more ignorant than the Tartars of the Ukraine (WN I. 
200). Whelan notes Smith’s conspicuous “disparagement of the level of civilization attained 
by the Aztec and Inca empires” and “his defense of Spanish rule and the improvements it had 
brought to New Spain and South America.” Whelan 2009: 53. 
47 Jonsson 2010: 1355; also see Hopkins 2013: 60. 
48 Vimalassery 2013: 300. 
49 Wakefield 1968. 
50 On the significance of agriculture in Enlightenment theories of savagery and civilization, see 
Pocock 2005. 
51 Also see Whelan 2009: 61 
52 Rothscshild 2012; Hont 2005c. 
53 Williams 2014: 289. 
54 Ibid: 297. 
55 Mehta 1999; Pitts 2005; Armitage 2013c. 
56 Ince 2014; Fraser 2014, 2016; Dawson 2016. 
57 Beckert 2014. 
58 Sartori 2006. 
59 Skinner 1969; Pocock 1990. 
60 See, for instance, Ince 2012. For recent critiques of linguistic contextualism, see Moyn 2014; 
Koskenniemi 2013. 
